

The Subject Matter of the Psychology of Personality

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The Subject Matter of the Psychology of Personality

A considerable number of studies have recently, with increasing insistence, been stressing the need to conceptualize whatever of value has been accumulated by the various schools of Soviet psychology on the psychology of the personality and to delineate the subject matter of that area of study (see: L. I. Antsyferova, 1981; V. V. Davydov, 1979; B. F. Lomov, 1981; A. V. Petrovskii, 1981; E. V. Shorokhova, 1982). Today, the various schools studying personality (e.g., those of B. G. Anan'ev and V. N. Myasishchev, of L. S. Vygotsky, A. N. Leont'ev, and A. R. Luria, of S. L. Rubinshtein, of B. M. Teplov, and of D. N. Uznadze) almost never "cross each other's paths." One of the impediments to productive dialogue about the subject matter of the psychology of personality derives from the very logic of empirical research, the assumption that there is some universal phenomenology that actually results in a description of the subject matter of the psychology of personality as a unidimensional structure rather than a systemic structure. The original view of the personality as a heterogeneous systemic structure would, however, help psychologists in different fields to acquire a more nuanced overview of the special area covered by the single subject of the psychology of personality and would help pinpoint two

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groups of problems: (a) study of the specifics of their findings, the methods they use, and the laws they discover, seen then as facts, methods, and laws characterizing a specific facet of that multifaceted object called the personality; (b) discovery of general laws cutting across disciplines, and the building of conceptual bridges between various disciplines studying the personality. To deal with these problems, representatives of the different schools should discard their own egocentricity and look at the views on, facts about, and methods of studying the personality obtained in other areas of psychology within a single conceptual framework. We shall attempt such an approach in this article.

A starting point for further analysis of the various approaches to study of the personality will be the following description we have selected as the subject matter of the psychology of personality:

Personality \neq individuality; this is a special quality that *is acquired* by the individual in society, within the totality of the social relations into which the individual *is drawn*. . . . In other words, the personality is a *systemic* and hence a “*suprasensory*” quality, although the bearer of this quality is a fully sensuous, physical individual, with all his innate and acquired characteristics. These characteristics are only the preconditions (premises) for the formation and functioning of the personality, like the external conditions and life circumstances that fall to the lot of the individual. Viewed thus, the problem of personality acquires a new psychological dimension: a dimension *different* from that in which particular mental processes, properties, and states of human beings are studied. This dimension has to do with the person’s place, his *position*, in a system, that system being the system of social relations and *communicative interactions* that are available to the particular person; it deals with the question of to what purpose and how a person uses what is innate in him and what he has acquired (including even the qualities of his temperament and, of course, acquired knowledge, skills, and abilities . . . thought). (A. N. Leont’ev, 1983. P. 385)

This description of the subject matter of the psychology of personality is an example of the abstraction the elaboration of which will give us a concrete picture of the psychology of the personality. To elaborate this abstraction we need first to specify as precisely as possible those benchmarks within it that delimit the general logic of construction of the subject matter of the psychology of the personality and, second, to indicate those specific areas of the psychology of personality illuminated by these benchmarks.

The first of these benchmarks is the demarcation between the concepts of "individual" and "personality," which practically all currents in Soviet general psychology recognize to be necessary for psychological analyses, however different their interpretations of these concepts may be (see, for example: B. G. Anan'ev, 1980; B. F. Lomov, 1981; S. L. Rubinshtein, 1973; B. M. Teplov, 1964; Sh. A. Nadirashvili, 1974). Nor is this surprising since without such a demarcation, it is hardly possible to approach the problem of the relationship between the biological and the social in the individual person, or related questions dealing with the determining factors in the development of the personality and with the relationship between its formal-dynamic characteristics and its substantive characteristics.

The second benchmark is the *delimitation of object-oriented activity as a system-forming basis of the personality*. Activity, through which the objective social relations of man in the world are realized, is the substance of personality and its individual consciousness. Through being transformed into activity, the properties of the individual make their contribution to the development of the personality. The term *substance* is used here in the sense given it in dialectical materialism. As V. P. Kuz'min has observed, "Materialism makes use of the concept of substance to reveal a necessary dependence, the relationship between a phenomenon and the principal foundation of a particular group of phenomena—for example, labor as the substance of value" (V. P. Kuz'min, 1976. P. 47). Just as labor in Marx's *Capital* is the material foundation of such a suprasensory systemic structure as

value, the totality of activities realizing social relations is the foundation for the group of systemic qualities designated by the concept "personality." Once object-oriented activity is taken as a point of departure for, and a method of, analysis of personality, we have rejected a static understanding of the personality and its structure as "things" and have indicated that the fundamental form of existence of the personality is its development.

The third benchmark is a *new schema for the determinants of the development of the personality*. Metaphysical, two-factor conceptions of the determination of the development of the personality, whether the two factors environment and heredity are seen to converge (W. Stern) or to confront each other as a clash between the id and the superego (Freud), must be replaced by a fundamentally new paradigm describing the relationships between "the individual" and the "personality" (see, for example, P. Ya. Gal'perin, A. V. Zaporozhets, S. N. Karpova, 1978). The three following aspects are distinguished: *the properties of the individual as organic preconditions for the development of the personality, the social environment as a condition for the development of the personality, and contradictions in the system of object-oriented activity as the driving force of the development of the personality*. Each of these aspects is covered by special areas in the study of the personality, areas that differ and are not yet adequately correlated with one another. Ideas concerning the organic preconditions for the development of the personality remain mere words if one does not draw on the rich theoretical constructions and empirical data accumulated in differential psychophysiology. But research in differential psychophysiology will resemble "a cat playing by itself" if the subject matter of such research is not seen to be the organic preconditions for the development of the personality, thus placing it in the context of the overall system of knowledge of the psychology of the personality. The organic preconditions, whether they are natural predispositions or temperament, do not in themselves predetermine the development of aptitudes and character, just as the social conditions of life do not in themselves predetermine whether from

these conditions will emerge the adapter, concerned for his own well-being, or the fighter, ready to give his life for the creation of a new society. In analyzing the social environment as a condition for the development of the personality, we inevitably enter into study of the influence of society on the personality and an analysis of the place of the individual in society, problems that cannot be solved without recourse to social, historical, developmental, and educational psychology. Each of these disciplines in turn risks, for example, reducing "the personality" to "a role" or confusing "social character" with "individual character" if other determinants of the development of the personality and aspects of study of the personality are not constantly kept at least at the periphery of research in these areas of psychology. In discussing the social environment as a condition for the development of the personality, we should like to emphasize that the environment, opened to the child only as objective reality (in the Marxist sense of the term) transformed by man's collective activity ("a field of meanings" that preserve within them various socially elaborated behavioral patterns, social norms, values, roles, etc.—A. N. Leont'ev, 1979), determines the development of the personality. Until the child comes into contact with this objective reality in the course of joint activity with other people, the social environment does not open before him as a world of culture and social practice. Penetration into this world, the socialization of the child, brings about the assimilation of various social roles, the formation of social character, the development of aptitudes, etc. In analyzing the role of the social environment in the development of the personality, we shall view the personality as an object of social development, i.e., we shall, as it were, try to look at the personality from the perspective of society. We shall be quite consciously abstracting from the unconditional fact that the process of socialization of the personality is always a process of its individualization. In reality, the personality is not molded by the contours of fixed social roles. It is not a passive copy of culture, as is at times implicitly or explicitly claimed in foreign role conceptions of the personality. Accordingly, the abstraction originally assumed in

the analysis of the movement from society to the personality, which identified the personality as an object of social development, exhausts the sphere of its influence as soon as we move on to an analysis of movement from the individual to society and begin to investigate the motive forces of development of the personality and manifestations of the personality as the subject of activity.

Equipped with these benchmarks, set by the overall logic of construction of the subject matter of the psychology of the personality, we shall attempt to delimit the general and the specific tasks facing study of the various aspects of the psychology of personality.

Properties of the physical individual as organic preconditions of the development of personality. We use the term *properties of the physical individual*, introduced by B. G. Anan'ev, since it is less ambiguous than the common term *individual properties* and focuses on study of the organic preconditions for the development of personality. The term *individual properties* in the psychology of personality often embraces anything one likes, from the biochemical properties of the organism up to the social status of the individual in the group. From our point of view, it is the properties of the physical individual that should be the subject matter of differential psychophysiology. Anan'ev subdivided these properties into two classes: the class of age- and sex-related properties and the class of individual-typical properties (constitution, neurodynamic properties, and characteristics related to the functional asymmetry of the hemispheres). Temperament and predispositions are the highest form of integration of primary properties of the physical individual.

The school of B. M. Teplov and V. D. Nebylitsyn has conducted a broad range of studies on neurodynamic properties; their work has laid the foundations for Soviet psychophysiology of individual differences. The research of this school, focused primarily on an analysis of the general and the specific properties of the nervous system, has shown an increasingly distinct tendency to view properties of the individual as preconditions for the

development of the personality, not as a basis on which the personality is then built as a second story, as it were (see B. M. Teplov, 1961; V. D. Nebylitsyn, 1976; E. A. Golubeva, 1980; K. M. Gurevich, 1970; N. S. Leites, 1975; I. V. Ravich-Shcherbo, 1978; V. M. Rusalov, 1979; and others). The same idea is found in studies by V. S. Merlin (1968) and E. A. Klimov (1969), who pointed out the incorrectness of deriving individual properties of the personality from the psychodynamic properties of the physical individual, such as introversion-extroversion in Eysenck's conception.

Despite the uniqueness and interindividual variation in the properties of the physical individual, whether in terms of age-related sensitivity, emotionality, introversion, or neuroticism, all these properties describe not the substantive, but the *formal-dynamic*, characteristics of the behavior of the individual person and the *energy* aspect of his mental processes (see I. M. Palei, V. K. Gerbachevskii, 1972). This must not be forgotten. Otherwise we shall find ourselves creating substantive typologies of personality on the basis of formal properties of the individual. All such typologies are based upon a methodological premise that regards "being an individual personality" as belonging to the very nature of the individual. It is here of no fundamental importance on what such typologies are based: body constitution (E. Kretschmer), somatotype (W. Sheldon), introversion-extroversion (Eysenck), or growth, weight, etc. If a study in differential psychophysiology should find itself to be in the procrustean bed of two factors and conceive the personality as a mythical biosocial being, it will have no recourse other than to find correlations between personal properties and properties of the physical individual or to reduce one to the other.

If, on the other hand, properties of the physical individual are seen as organic preconditions for the development of personality, then differential psychophysiology will have to determine those transformations that the properties of the physical individual undergoes in the process of activity. Thus, for example, physiological drive initially causes undirected activity, and then, after

being objectified in some object, begins to direct the individual person's activity. The formal dynamic characteristics of need begin to function as the driving force of motive, which can then be measured (V. V. Stolin, 1979). Another example of the influence of the properties of the physical individual on the development of the personality is in study of how pathologically altered properties of nervous processes constrict the pathways normally possible for accomplishing acts and operations, thus leading to the formation of characteristics of an epileptic nature (B. V. Zeigarnik, B. S. Bratus', 1980). The discovery of these patterns will enable us to pinpoint some of the growth points in the psychophysiology of individual differences.

From society to the personality: Levels of analysis of the personality in a system of social relations and the mechanism of socialization. The personality, studied as the object of social development, receives its substantive characteristics through the system of social functions and roles it assimilates in the socialization process. Describing the personality in terms of a system of roles, social psychologists characterize a personality as a representative of a social group, class, or social whole. This brings up questions of the relationship between social and interpersonal relations and the mechanisms by which the personality assimilates social-historical experience. According to G. M. Andreeva (1981), to pose the first of these questions appropriately it is necessary to discard a mechanistic view of interpersonal relations as located "above," "below," or somewhere "outside" the social relations that determine the development of the personality. To deal with this question one must clearly delimit the various levels in the study of how the individual is drawn into social relations. Thus, for example, a study of the views a certain social group entertains about mutual relations between "leaders in general" and "subordinates in general" is one of the levels of study of the personality in a system of social relations; the study of "normative-role" relations among participants in joint activity is a second level; and the study of relations between people in which the motives of one person acquire a subjective value and a person-

al meaning for another person is still another level of analysis of how the individual personality is drawn into social relations. To deal with the question of the relationship between social and interpersonal relations we thought it would be useful to distinguish three levels of analysis of the involvement of the personality in social relations: the quasi-psychological, the interpsychological, and the intrapsychological.

The *quasi-psychological level* encompasses studies of social roles, standards of perception, and personality traits embedded in the concepts of language; these reflect a personality typical for a given culture, nation, or group. It is at this level that most studies of the problems of the socially typical in the personality, particularly studies of social and national character, are carried out. We might observe that some widely used questionnaires, such as the Cattell questionnaire, are instruments that operate primarily at the quasi-psychological level of analysis of the personality. A conceptual bridge can be built between the quasi-psychological and the interpsychological levels of analysis of the personality thanks to a concept, developed by V. A. Yadov (1980), of the predispositional regulation of the social behavior of the individual personality; this concept can be used as a basis for developing typologies of social characters. But this concept also may be used to study, first, those ideas about norms, values, and ideals that for the individual person function as the "only knowable" motives of his behavior; to come closer to a study of the motives "really at work," an interpsychological level of analysis of the relations of the personality in society is necessary.

The *interpsychological level* of analysis encompasses studies of social relations of the personality that are mediated by joint activity. Let us take A. V. Petrovskii's (1979) theory, for example. This theory employs the concept of activity and sees interpersonal relations as mediated through activity, and has been able to pinpoint a number of phenomena (for example, collectivist self-determination, reference) that are simultaneously both a characteristic of a group and a quality of the personality. The question arises, Under what conditions are these phenomena, which in the

first instance characterize *normatively set role relations* among the participants in joint activity, transformed into yet another class of phenomena reflecting interpersonal relationships having to do with *personal meaning*? Where does the “transition from the mask to the person begin in the fullness of his human existence”? (S. L. Rubinshtein, 1973. P. 364). The conditions for the transition from the phenomena in the class “group-personality” to meaning-related manifestations of the personality may be studied on the basis of material on social perception. Thus, A. A. Bodalev (1965) empirically discovered phenomena illustrating how one person’s perception of another is contingent upon different sets; in our view, these phenomena characterize the normative-role perception of a person as a typical representative of some social group; they may be used as indicators characterizing the level of relations in which the personality is involved. However, a person need only distance himself from those models that are in the eyes of others with whom he interacts, the expression of norms, various standards, and stereotypes, and conditions will be created for a transition from an “objective” perception to a “subjective” perception (A. U. Kharash, 1980), from normatively set role relations to relations having to do with personal meaning. *Deviance from a normatively set activity is also a condition for a transition from role relations to relations of personal meaning* (A. G. Asmolov, 1979), which are studied at the *intrapersonal level* of analysis of the personality’s relations in society.

The second major problem involved in study of the role of the social environment in the development of the personality is the *problem of socialization*. Despite all the contradictory views of the process of socialization, there are no substantive alternatives to Vygotsky’s concept of the mechanism of socialization as a transition from the interpsychic to the intrapsychic. Actually, the mechanism underlying this transition is one of internalization-externalization. Three different elements must be distinguished in the mechanism of socialization: individualization—the transition from social, collective activity to individual forms of activ-

ity; intimization—the transition from “we” to “I,” reflecting the development of the individual person’s self-awareness; and the production of an internal level of consciousness—the transformation of the external into the internal (A. G. Asmolov, 1982).

Thus, our levels of analysis of the involvement of the personality in social relations enable us to perceive the various points of intersection of interpersonal relations in a system of social relations and to indicate the points where the efforts of teams of Soviet psychologists should be applied. Internalization is the mechanism for assimilating sociohistorical experience. If we are to fathom the psychological nature of the mechanisms of learning and education of the individual person, we must take into account the various facets of internalization. However, a fuller picture of the different views of the mechanisms of assimilation of sociohistorical experience can be obtained only if we move from an examination of the person as an object of social development to a study of the various manifestations of the active aspect of the individual person.

The driving forces of development of the personality. There is an extremely wide range of approaches to study of the problem of the driving forces behind the development of the personality. However, as L. I. Antsyferova (1974) has pointed out, despite the diversity of these approaches, most of them, in foreign psychology, are based on two methodological premises: one that postulates a tendency toward equilibrium (psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology, neobehaviorism), and one that postulates a tendency toward tension (the concepts of humanist and existentialist psychology, e.g., of A. Maslow, G. Allport, and V. Frankl). We shall not undertake to analyze these approaches here (M. G. Yaroshevskii, 1974; V. A. Petrovskii, 1975; and V. G. Aseev, 1976), but merely note some features they have in common in their concepts of the driving forces of the development of the personality:

1. They all postulate the existence of some single original source, a *de facto*, prime mover of the development of the

personality, which is, moreover, invariant and embedded in the depths of the physical individual.

2. A formal-dynamic description of the driving forces of the development of the personality predominates over their substantive analysis, and neither method has an adequate approach to the study of the sociohistorical determinateness of these forces.

3. They postulate that the subject's active aspect is subordinated to some preestablished end and see man as predominantly an adaptative being.

In contrast, Soviet psychology is based on the principle of the self-development of the personality, which entails a number of postulates as well: first, the role of the struggle between opposites, the contradiction and the harmony of these opposites as the driving force of the development of the personality (see L. I. Antsyferova, 1978; B. V. Zeigarnik, 1979); and, second, the existence of a source of self-development of activity in the very process of activity (S. L. Rubinshtein, 1973; A. N. Leont'ev, 1977). In our view, D. N. Uznadze (1966) made the first productive attempt to find the source of development of activity in activity itself. Uznadze introduced the ideas of a functional tendency, which stressed that activity was generated not by the influence of need, but that it itself contained a tendency toward self-activation. This functional tendency is the source of play and creativity, which lends itself to slogans such as "creativity for creativity's sake" or "play for play's sake." Uznadze's ideas of functional tendency provide a theoretical foundation for specific research into the motivation of a child's development, for example, the need for the impressions of experience (L. I. Bozhovich, 1968) and the need for communication and social interaction (M. I. Lisina, 1978) as specifically human driving forces behind the development of the personality.

In such studies, which in fact accept the principle of self-development, we find new ideas wrapped in old terminological clothing. Let us consider, for example, the notion of a need for communication or impressions, i.e., a need that does not take the form of an impulse from without or from within, is not adaptive

and homeostatic by nature, but rather has the very circumstance of interaction of the subject with the world as its motive source. We may presume that in such a case we are not dealing with needs in the orthodox sense of the word, but in fact with functional tendencies. Conceptions of the mechanisms of self-development of activity have been dealt with further in studies by V. A. Petrovskii (1975) and V. G. Aseev (1978).

Periodization in the development of the personality and approaches to its study. Any notions concerning the driving forces of development of the personality must be tested in terms of the periodization of mental development. In D. B. El'konin's view (1971), the driving force of development is the contradictions between the operational-technical abilities of the child and the development of his motivational-need sphere. The following approaches have subsequently fleshed out, as it were, this paradigm of mental development: (a) studies of communication or social interaction as a mechanism that runs across the sequence of dominant activities in ontogeny (M. I. Lisina, 1978); (b) studies of the correlation between age-related periodizations in the development of the physical individual and periodizations in the development of the personality, in particular, delimitation of the role of gender, the sensitive periods in the maturation of the individual (N. S. Leites, 1978) in the process of development of the personality (How, for example, does the emergence of the stage of direct emotional communication that is inherent in the first year of life [M. I. Lisina] correlate with the sensitive period in the maturation of such parameters of temperament as emotionality and general activeness [V. D. Nebylitsyn]?); (c) analysis of the periodization of development of the personality in maturity has traditionally been a lacuna in Soviet psychology (see, on this point, B. G. Anan'ev, 1980); (d) study of changes in various new structures of the personality at different stages in its development (A. V. Zaporozhets, Ya. Z. Neverovich, E. V. Subbotskii, S. G. Yakobson, V. E. Chudnovskii, V. V. Stolin).

So far we have considered questions dealing with the various aspects of development of the personality. However, if analysis

should center on the question of *what* is formed, we would find it necessary to examine ideas about the structure of the personality.

Units in the analysis of the structure of the personality.

There are two methodological premises that encumber a heuristic approach to the problem of the structure of the personality in contemporary psychology. The first of these is the implicit identification of the structure of the personality with the structure of some physical object, for example, with the anatomical structure of the organism. This way of thinking about structure, inherited by psychology from mechanistic materialism, impels researchers toward an atomistic analysis of the mind, in which the subject being studied is broken down into elements that then lose the properties inherent in this subject seen as a whole (L. S. Vygotsky, 1956). Some clear-cut examples of such an approach to the study of the structure of the personality are conceptions in which this structure is mechanically built up out of a collection of various factors (personality traits) or units of temperament, motivation, past experience, character, etc. The products of an analysis that uses such a "factor" and "block" approach are either a congealed, static structure of the personality in which factors such as cyclothymia and schizothymia, or bohemianism and practicality, are brought together onto one plane (R. Cattell), or are "blocks" piled one on the other, with the genetic, structural, and functional links between them remaining unexplored. The second assumption is based on the belief that the properties of the personality as a whole are concentrated, as if at a focal point, in one, any one, dynamic structure of the personality, whether it be instinct, predisposition, set, attitude, need, or a motive (or a hierarchy of motives). The upshot of this approach is that a key characteristic of the personality such as direction, or orientation, becomes the cornerstone of a study of the structure of personality (see B. F. Lomov, 1981).

But direction is a broad *descriptive* characteristic of the structure of the personality. To explore it, one must move from an element-by-element analysis of the structure of the per-

sonality to a unit-by-unit analysis and delineate the criteria defining the units of an analysis of the structure of the personality, taking one's cue from conceptions of the parameters of the units of analysis of the mind as formulated by Vygotsky and developed in Soviet psychology (N. D. Gordeeva, V. P. Zinchenko, 1982) and from studies of the dynamic organization of the personality in Soviet and foreign psychology. We have distinguished the following criteria for a unit of analysis of the structure of the personality: (1) dynamicity (the personality is a dynamic structure, and this should be taken into account in defining such a unit); (2) objective content, intentionality (the objective content of the unit of a structure of the personality can be explored only after having discovered *toward what* the dynamic tendency is directed); (3) the level of reflection of some particular content (conscious, unconscious); (4) discovery of the origin and social determination of the parts of the structure of the personality; (5) the type of structural connection, in particular, the hierarchical interconnections in the organization; (6) elucidation of the development and self-development of the personality, its intrapersonal dynamics; (7) the necessity of reflecting the internal unity of the personality, for example, the unity of affect and intelligence; (8) the unit should also contain the properties of the whole, e.g., individual consciousness and activity of the personality, in the form of opposites; (9) the unit should be operational; (10) the unit should contain the essential properties of the whole.

Provided a unit for the analysis of the structure of the personality meets all these requirements, it should be able to uncover the mechanism of functioning and development determining the direction of the personality. If we are to delimit a unit of analysis of personality structure, we must in each instance distinguish such aspects of the dynamics of the personality as the motives of activity, personal meanings, sets, deeds, and activities (without extracting them one by one from the individual person's life course) and determine their genetic, functional, and structural interrelations. The *dynamic meaning systems of the personality*

can serve as such units, for example. This concept was introduced by Vygotsky, who defined a dynamic meaning system as a unity of affective and intellectual processes. Understanding the basic features of a dynamic meaning system as a unit of analysis of the personality entails discovering the mechanisms of generation and functioning of this system. In exploring the content of this system, the movement from activity to individual consciousness and from the individual consciousness of the personality to activity must be taken into account. The starting point for such a movement, apart from the aspect of the individual person's choice of motives, which is contingent first and foremost on that person's social position in society, is the generation of a dynamic meaning system in the process of an activity stimulated by a meaning-forming motive. Activity is also the system-constituting basis for a dynamic meaning system. A prime characteristic of meaning systems, the characteristic reflecting their social determination, is the circumstance that they are derived from the activities that in their totality generate these systems and realize objective social relations. The objective relations of the personality in the world, realized through activity, are internalized and embodied in individual consciousness in the form of the personal meaning given to the events and deeds of a person's life. An evaluation of personal meaning is engendered by emotions. The personal meaning of any event or act is also what we find in the units of the personality structure, i.e., it is the reflection of the content of the individual person's relation to reality. At the same time, personal meaning is "meaning for myself," and thus represents a unity of affective and intellectual processes. Personal meanings usually are situated at an uncognizable level in individual consciousness. But if personal meaning becomes conscious, it may become a value for the personality (B. V. Zeigarnik, B. S. Bratus', 1980). Personal meanings that have become conscious are not altered by the fact that they become conscious even if they suddenly prove to be contradictory to the norms and ideals shared by the personality or to other driving forces of the personality. The clue to the mechanism of the movement of personal meanings in individual con-

sciousness, i.e., for their intrapersonal dynamics, is to be sought in the contradictions, sometimes even the conflicts, among hierarchically related motives. But when in the struggle of motives one particular motive gains the upper hand, movement from personal meaning to activity begins. A question arises: How is an orientation to the real world, reflected in personal meaning, fixed in time, and how does it take part in the regulation of activity? In moving from individual consciousness to activity, we may distinguish the meaning set of the personality as one of the components of dynamic meaning systems. (A. G. Asmolov, 1979). Meaning sets ultimately determine the constancy and orientation of the personality, its deeds and actions.

Up to this point we have been moving mainly in the direction from activity to personality. However, to analyze the personal mechanisms of regulation of activity it is necessary to proceed in the reverse direction, from personality to activity, and to see the personality in one more projection, namely, the personality as the subject of activity.

The productive and instrumental level of manifestation of the personality as the subject of activity. In studying the personality as a subject of activity we shall be taking up problems of will, character, aptitudes, and talents, or, in other words, problems having to do with an analysis of the individuality of the personality. To undertake their study, we must, following A. N. Leont'ev (1975), reject the view that the personality is merely the product of past experience. The more mature the personality becomes, the more ramified is the system of its links with the world; and the more frequently it confronts the problem of choosing among various motives, the more it is transformed from an object of social evolution into the subject of activity and the creator of the social process. *When we study the personality as the subject of activity, we investigate how the personality transforms and creates objective reality, including itself, how it enters into an active relationship with its own experience, its own potential motives, and its own character, aptitudes, and the products of its activity.* A number of investigators have been attempting, with

increasing determination, to incorporate the principle of the subject of activity, formulated by S. L. Rubinshtein, into their analysis of the personality (see, for example, V. E. Chudnovskii, 1981; K. A. Abul'khamova-Slavskaya, 1982). Two levels of analysis of manifestations of the personality as the subject of activity may be distinguished: the productive and the instrumental.

In speaking of the *productive manifestations* of the personality as the subject of activity, we have in mind the processes in which the active personality is involved, i.e., processes that take place when deviations from the normatively set lines of behavior occur, processes that involve giving of oneself, and processes of transformation of oneself and others. One has only to bring about such a deviation and, in the undefined situation that arises, the personality is confronted with the problem of choosing among different motives and roles. It is in situations of free choice that the personality is manifested with particular prominence as a subject of activity, and the history of the development of the personality becomes the history of the alternatives it has rejected (V. F. Porshnev, 1969). Any typology of personality as individuality or any periodization of the development of the mature personality that is yet to be created must not disregard the specific manifestations of the personality in a situation of personal choice, or analysis of the personality's orientation in a system of meaning-forming motives. Not coincidentally, P. Ya. Gal'perin (1976) observed that the principal criterion of the maturity of the personality is its responsibility for its own deeds, and that only a socially responsible subject may be considered an individual person in the full sense of that word. In a situation of choice, the personality must create devices and means for controlling its own behavior. The instrumental historical-genetic method for studying higher mental functions (L. S. Vygotsky, A. R. Luria, 1930) has by no means exhausted all the possibilities of shifting the psychological analysis of the problem of choice from the sphere of speculative argumentation to the sphere of empirical investigation. The search for external and internal needs in a situation involving a conflict of motives and the study of rudimentary cultural forms of

will, such as casting lots, open the path to study of the origin of the various protective mechanisms of the personality. These devices for protection and compensation are seen in Vygotsky's school to be a means of self-regulation and control of the individual person's behavior, not as antagonists of consciousness (B. V. Zeigarnik, 1979).

Are not magical acts of driving out evil spirits but a rudimentary form of catharsis in sociogenesis? In ontogeny, is not identification but the act of putting oneself in another's place, only in compact form and translated to an ideal level? All these questions require special study aimed at investigating the social genesis of defense mechanisms in the history of society and the ontogeny of the personality. The personality appears as a subject of activity in problems of formation of new goals, i.e., goal formation (O. K. Tikhomirov, 1977). Not only self-transformations but also transformations that the individual person introduces into the meaning sphere of other persons, into culture, and into social production through his own deeds and acts may be ranked among the productive manifestations of the personality as the subject of activity. A. V. Petrovskii and B. A. Petrovskii (1982) have developed the concept of "personal contributions," which is intended to stress that the activeness of the personality, by which the personality's meaning relation to other people is accentuated, is realized by means of *acts*, i.e., unintended, normatively fluid manifestations of the subject's activeness, which bring about transformations in other people and thus make a contribution that is significant for them. In such acts the personality becomes personalized and extended into other persons. This is not "self-actualization," as understood by A. Maslow and G. Allport, but actualization of oneself in others, which is the principal path of development of the individuality of personality. Thus, the creative nature of the personality as the subject of activity, i.e., its individuality, is manifested in processes of personal choice, the posing of new goals, the mastery of various critical situations, and the transformation of oneself and others.

The character and the aptitudes of the personality may be

ranked among the *instrumental manifestations* of the personality as a subject of activity. Aptitudes determine the measure of success and effectiveness of activity, as has been observed by a number of Soviet psychologists, representing the most varied views on the genesis of aptitudes (A. N. Leont'ev, S. L. Rubinshtein, B. N. Teplov). In ranking character as an instrumental manifestation of personality, *we understand by character that fixed form of expression of meaningful experience, i.e., meaning sets, actualized in a personality's own individual style of action, by means of which various motives are realized*. Whereas motivations determine the life strategy of the personality, character determines its behavioral tactics for achieving its motives. This concept of character is based on views developed by L. S. Vygotsky, S. L. Rubinshtein, and D. N. Uznadze. From the viewpoint of these authors, who constructed a dynamic concept of character, the units of analysis of character are the dynamic tendencies of the personality and its fixed generalized sets. Sets have a number of distinguishing features. First, fixed meaning sets are preserved over time, and convey the personality's dominant attitudes toward the real world around it, ensuring constancy in the person's behavior. Second, these sets are actualized when they encounter the right situation and are manifested in a person's individual style of activity. Third, the fate of sets in the process of activity enables us to understand the genesis of a person's character (see S. L. Rubinshtein, 1973). Meaning sets become the traits of character. Fourth, meaning sets are manifested in the psychotonic activeness of the personality (the material substrate of character), which A. V. Zaporozhets (1960) and H. Wallon (see L. I. Antsyferova, 1981) attempted to study. The psychotonic expressions of character are also that visible language by means of which nonverbal communication takes place. By relying on these manifestations we are able to see one of the methodological paths of transformation of a person's character and its reorganization in the process of social interaction and activity. Often situations in which the personality and the character conflict with one another arise. The personality relates to the character as to

something external, which helps or hinders the achievement of a goal. How often one meets people who complain about their character, but one rarely meets a person who complains about his personality. Such relationships between the level of content of the personality (its values, meanings, and motives) and the level of expression of the personality (its character) give unequivocal evidence that a unity, but not an identity, exists between personality and character. In conclusion, let us again mention some of the essential features of the personality as a subject of activity.

To be a personality means to have an active life position, to make choices that arise from internal necessity, to be able to evaluate the consequences of a decision once taken, and to accept responsibility for them before oneself and the society in which one lives.